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Abstract
We consider a model where agents differ in their ‘types’ which determines their
voluntary contribution towards a public good. We analyze what the equilibrium com-
position of groups are under centralized and centralized choice. We show that there
exists a top-down sorting equilibrium i.e. an equilibrium where there exists a set of
prices which leads to groups that can be ordered by level of types, with the first k types
in the group with the highest price and so on. This exists both under decentralized and
centralized choosing. We also analyze the model with endogenous group size and ex-
amine under what conditions is top-down sorting socially efficient. We illustrate when
integration (i.e. mixing types so that each group’s average type if the same) is socially
better than top-down sorting. Finally, we show that top down sorting is efficient even
when groups compete among themselves.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze whether groups can ‘price’ group membership to screen who becomes
a member. Joining many groups and clubs is not costless. Many of them require monetary
fees, or non-monetary ‘sacrifices’ to become a member Winslow (1999). Examples abound,
new members of a criminal gang or a terrorist organization have to undergo hazing rituals
(Vigil, 1996). Similarly, new recruits into many military units and college fraternities also
have to go through painful or shameful activities to be accepted into them (Ostvik and
Rudmin 2001, Mercuro, Merritt and Fiumefreddo 2014, De Klerk 2013, Groves, Griggs
and Leflay 2012, Keating et al 2005). Even religious groups have elaborate initiation rites
(Berman 2000, Iannacone 1992). Exclusive clubs, or elite schools require the payment of very
expensive fees to become members (Jenkins, Micklewright and Schnepf 2008). The question
of interest in this paper is the rationale for these practices, the equilibrium value of such
fees, and their welfare implications.
In all those groups, the value of being a member depends on the extent to which other
participants contribute to the common cause or public good they provide. At the same time,
individuals differ in their inclination and ability to dedicate themselves to the cause, i.e. to
contribute to the public good provided by the group. For this reason, the utility obtained
by any member in belonging to a group will depend on the types of all the other members.
As a consequence, the group will be interested in making sure that those who gain entry as
members are of the right type. But these types are not necessarily observable, and the entry
fee is a way to select members in an incentive compatible way.
Our model assumes there are a number of participants in a game which has two stages.
The first stage develops as follows. A set of ‘entrepreneurs’, one for each of a fixed number
of groups, posts a price for belonging to their group. The participants then decide, inde-
pendently and simultaneously, whether to pay the price to one of those groups, or none
at all. In the second stage, the participants who are in a group decide on their level of
effort/contribution to a public good for the group to which they belong.
The participants differ in the way they benefit from the public good. Each individual is
characterized by a type that is a multiple of the amount of the public good. This hetero-
geneity can be variously interpreted as either a different intrinsic personal enjoyment of the
good, or a difference in the degree of altruism (i.e. some individuals internalize the benefit of
the public good on others to a larger extent). One important implication of this assumption
is that the group members do not care care directly about the types of others, or about
the group size. This is because we assume there is no direct externality caused by others’
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types or the number of individuals in the group. Individuals do care about the actions taken
by other group members, because those actions affect the amount of public good provided
which they enjoy, and contributions to the public good are indeed affected by their types.
This assumption distinguishes our model from others in the literature of club games (starting
with Buchanan, 1965) and congestion games (Oakland 1972, Baumol and Oates 1988).
Clearly, since the groups provide a public good, we would in general have an under-
provision of the public good in the group if the provision is voluntary and decided on an
individual basis. But many of the groups that we have used to motivate our model have the
possibility of imposing a contribution level within the group. We can think for example of
the tightly hierarchical organization of most armies, and even gangs. For this reason, we also
study group formation when contributions within groups are decided by a planner within
the group.
Whether the individual or the group leader (social planner) decides the contribution
level, our first result is that in both cases we can establish the existence of a top-down
sorting equilibrium. This equilibrium has the following characteristic. The ‘entrepreneurs’
announce a list of distinct prices, which thus can be ordered from highest to lowest. The
participants sort themselves into groups by their types. A set composed of the highest types
chooses to belong to the group with the highest price. Another set of types just below the
first chooses to belong to the group with the second highes price. This continues until the
last set of types, who belong to a group with price zero.
We analyze the equilibrium under both centralized and decentralized decision-making.
One difference between the equilibrium under centralized and decentralized choice of effort
is that under decentralized effort choice every individual gains whenever the average type
of the group increases (although relatively higher types gain more, which is the basis for
segregation). On the other hand, with centralized effort choice within the group an increase
in average type improves the utility of above average types within the group, but decreases for
below average types. This happens because the group planner does not know the individual
types within the group, and so she requires the same level of contribution from every one.
We next turn our attention to some welfare properties of the decentralized process for
group formation. For this we need to take into account both group composition and group
size. In terms of group composition, we compare the welfare of the top-down sorting equilib-
rium with the one arising from an equilibrium in which there is no sorting, and all groups
have equal average types. It turns out that the answer depends on the curvature of the
output function. For example, when the concavity is such the risk aversion parameter in the
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CRRA function is bigger than one (i.e. α > 1), then the top-down sorting equilibrium is less
socially beneficial than one where the population is sorted accross groups so that all groups
have the same average type. We call this ‘integration’. A corollary of this result is that in
this case, the segregation occurring in equilibrium is socially inefficient. On the other hand,
when α < 1, then the top-down sorting equilibrium has a larger total welfare than the one
achieved when groups are ‘integrated’ and have the same average types.
In terms of size, for α > 1, the optimal size of the group is N , the whole population,
since individual payoff increases with the size of the coalition. For α < 1, the optimal size of
the group has to trade off the benefits from segregation (which are highest if average group
quality increases, say by dropping the lowest types in the group), with those arising from
having larger groups, because group size affects equilibrium contribution levels.
Finally, up to now we have assumed that there is no inter-group conflict. However, in
some of our applications the groups compete with one another after they are formed (again,
it is easier to think of armies and gangs, but even educational institutions compete ex post for
top-paying jobs). We show that our top-down sorting equilibrium also exists in this context,
so our conclusions are robust to this kind of setting.
Our paper has important implications for policy. There are relevant environments (α >
1) where the social planner would like an ‘integrated’ society, which might not arise in
equilibrium. She wants to achieve this purely on social surplus maximization grounds. This
provides a new rationale for integration in various social domains, like education and housing,
without having to resort to preference about equality. We will discuss this in more depth in
the conclusion.
1.1 Literature
Our paper develops a novel theory of group formation. Clearly, this paper links to the
classical literature on club theory (Buchanan 1965, Berglas 1976). This literature does not
consider differences in information about preferences, and therefore it does not provide a
rationale for undertaking actions to signal preferences. Somewhat closer to our work is
Ben Porath and Dekel (1992), who use the potential for self sacrifice as a way to signal
future intentions. However, they do it because of equilibrium selection problems, and the
self sacrifice does not actually occur in equilibrium. Helsley and Strange (1991), in turn,
model club formation in a context with homogeneous tastes and costs. In their model fees
and prices are used to obtain second best usage when congestion within a club is a problem.
In terms of theory, two close papers to our’s are Jaramillo and Moizeau (2002), and
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Cornes and Silva (2013). Jaramillo and Moizeau (2003) study a model where individuals
differ in income, and higher income people desire a different level of the local public good.
Since information about income is private, individuals use costly signalling to join a club with
others who have similar income (and, hence, preferences for the local public good). Different
from us, the group formation is uncoordinated (there is no entrepreneur creating the clubs),
there are only two types, and they do not contemplate the possibility of internal coordination
of contributions. Also, in their model there is no reason for individuals of different types to
group together in the social optimum. In Cornes and Silva (2013) some people love prestige
(they have higher utility from contributing relative to the average) and others are purists.
Fees serve to sort them into clubs. The model, unlike ours has both positive and negative
externalities, but the competitive equilibrium is inefficient. Competition yields co-ordination
benefits with the formation of prestige clubs.
Our paper also has some connection to a literature that is related to group formation in
contexts were types are differentiated horizontally. For example, Levy and Razin (2012) ana-
lyze explicit displays of religious beliefs and cooperation within the religious group. Baccara
and Yariv (2013), also analyze group formation and contribution to horizontally differenti-
ated tasks.
Another relevant literature for us relates to assortative matching. Durlauf and Seshadri
(2003) examines when assortative matching is efficient. Legros and Newman (2007) study
sufficient conditions for assortative matching in equilibrium. Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela
(2008) analyze when costly signaling is necessary for assortative matching under incomplete
information. Importantly, they check when gains form assortative matching are offset by sig-
nalling costs. There is also a large literature studying sorting into schools, to take advantage
of peer effects (Epple Romano 1998, Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2003, Hsieh and Urquiola
2006 or MacLeod and Urquiola 2015).
There is a body of work in the experimental literature exploring how endogenous sorting
into groups can help solve the problem of free riding. For example, costly rituals have been
shown to promote greater co-operation (Sosis 2004, Ruffle and Sosis 2007). Page, Putterman
and Unel (2005) show that endogenous segregation helps avoid free-riding and provides some
support for the efficiency of top down sorting. Cimino (2011) does a survey based experiment
where participants are asked about an initiation activity for a group, which itself provides
benefits to members. Those participants randomly allocated to a group providing a good
with a more public component were significantly more likely to choose a stressful initiation
task. This sort of hazing can be considered as an entry fee to prevent free riding. This would
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be very much in the spirit of our model. Aimone et al. (2013) show that something akin to
our endogenous segregation equilibrium happens in the lab. In their experiment participants
can choose to participate in a voluntary contribution public good game in groups having
different rates of return. People that are more prone to contribute to public goods join those
groups with lower rates of return, thus signalling their type. As in our model, a costly choice
(in this case, choosing a less efficient technology) is a credible signal of a type wishing to
contribute more to the public good.
In addition to experimental results, there is a significant ethnographic evidence that is
connected to our issues. For example, Vigil (1996) analyzes gang initiation. This study is
consistent with our model, i.e. initiation rites are used to screen potential members. Sosis,
Kress and Boster (2007) show the importance of such costly male rituals in signalling com-
mitment and promoting solidarity among men who need to organise themselves for warfare.
Soler (2012) rationalises the existence of wasteful religious rituals. It analyzes the practice
of Candomble, an Afro Brazilian ritual. It shows that participation is correlated with higher
contributions to public goods, which is consistent with our model. Cleaver (2004) shows that
entry fees are used in clubs to exclude the “non elite” .
2 Model: signaling and coalition formation
This model has two stages. There are a large and finite number of agents playing the game
N . Each agent j ∈ N is characterized by a level of preference for the public good ξj. In the
first stage the agents form coalitions of a fixed number of players N , in a way we will describe
in section 2.1. In the second stage, once a coalition is formed, every agent simultaneously
decides how much to contribute towards a public good, xj taking as given the coalition
structure.
The total amount of the public good is given by V
(∑N
i=1 xi
)
, with V (.) being a strictly
concave twice continuously differentiable function. The personal cost of the contribution xj
is given by x2j/2. The utility of every agent after the coalition is formed is
Uj = ξjV
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
−
1
2
x2j
The parameter ξj indicates that the individual may care for more than only his own utility
but she internalizes the benefits of other players. A player with a ξj > 1 is thought to be
“altruistic” whereas ξj = 1 is a selfish player. The value of ξj is obviously relevant for all
players in any coalition, as it increases the marginal value of contributions of their owners.
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It is also the private information of the players, which can be (partially) solved using a
pre-game costly signaling exercise which we now describe.
2.1 The signaling game
Consider a finite set of coalitions l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, each with N slots.1 Let ξ¯l =
∑
i∈l ξi.
Assume as well that each N is large enough so that the compositional impact of changing
one member’s type on the ξ¯l of coalition l is negligible. The coalition formation game is as
follows. A set of ‘entrepreneurs’ post a set of prices pl for l ∈ {1, . . . , L}. We think of prices
that need not be ‘monetary’. Any costly action whose effect in utility is separable would
work. Then all individuals in the population decide which coalition to join (and thus pay
the price of joining). If a coalition is oversubscribed (it has M > N candidates applying
to it), then a fair lottery decides which M − N candidates get allocated to not being in a
coalition, which is free and obviously has enough capacity for the full group.
Order arbitrarily the available coalitions. We denote by top-down sorting the following
assignment of members into coalitions according to their type. Coalition 1 gets assigned
the N highest type members, coalition 2 the N highest type members among the remaining
ones, and so on until all members are assigned to one (and only one) coalition. The top-down
sorting leads to a coalition structure with types stratified from higher to lower. Namely, given
two coalitions l > k and two members i, j that are assigned to either coalition by top-down
sorting, then, ξi > ξj and ξ¯l ≥ ξ¯k. To ensure that this inequality is strict for at least one
pair of players in two different coalitions, we assume that two successive coalitions cannot
be fully occupied by players of the same type. As mentioned above to join a coalition l, they
must choose an action with cost pl. The last group is the option not being in a coalition.
We say that an assignment of members to coalitions and a vector of entry costs forms an
equilibrium when, given the costs, no individual prefers to change coalitions and either a
coalition is full or its associated cost is zero.
Denote by
∂Uj
∂ξ¯l
the derivative of the equilibrium utility of individual j with respect to changes in the average
type ξ¯l of the coalition to which they belong. The differential sensitivity of different types
of potential coalition members to the composition of coalitions has implications for coalition
formation that we now analyze.
1We assume for simplicity that all coalitions are equally sized. Nothing substantial changes if they are
still exogenous but differently sized. Later on we address endogenously sized coalitions.
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Proposition 1 There exists an assignment equilibrium with top-down sorting if whenever
i and j are such that ξi > ξj we have that
∂Ui
∂ξ¯l
−
∂Uj
∂ξ¯l
> 0 (1)
Letting ξi∗(l) be the type of the lowest member in coalition l, the fee for a full coalition l is
defined recursively as:
pl =
ξ¯l∫
ξ¯l+1
∂U
i∗(l)
∂ξ¯j
dξ¯j + pl+1, l = 1, . . . , L− 1, (2)
with pL = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
This condition provides a test for the existence of endogenous sorting.
2.2 Trust and group contributions
Given the coalitions that have formed, we now analyze the equilbria in the subgames where
the coalitions are present. Remember that
Uj = ξjV
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
−
1
2
x2j
The FOC of the second stage problem are
∂Uj
∂xj
= ξjV
′
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
− xj = 0
This implies that for all i, j
xj
ξj
=
xi
ξi
So normalizing ξ1 = 1
ξix1 = xi
and hence in equilibrium
V ′
(
x1
N∑
i=1
ξi
)
= x1 (3)
which yields a unique equilibrium given the composition of the coalition. Let a particular
coalition A composed of a group of people with qualities (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn) with
ξ¯l =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξi
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Totally differentiating 3 with respect to ξ¯l we get;
V ′′
(
Nx1ξ¯l
) ∂x1
∂ξ¯l
Nξ¯l + V
′′
(
Nx1ξ¯l
)
Nx1 =
∂x1
∂ξ¯l
∂x1
∂ξ¯l
=
V ′′
(
Nx1ξ¯l
)
Nx1
1− V ′′
(
Nx1ξ¯l
)
Nξ¯l
< 0
so contributions decrease with average quality. Nevertheless equilibrium utility
Uj = ξjV
(
Nx1ξ¯l
)
−
ξ2j
2
x21
so that
∂Uj
∂ξ¯l
= ξjV
′
(
Nx1ξ¯l
)
Nξ¯l
∂x1
∂ξ¯l
+ ξjNx1V
′
(
Nx1ξ¯l
)
− ξ2jx1
∂x1
∂ξ¯l
= ξjNx
2
1
(
1− V ′′
(
Nx1ξ¯l
)
ξj
1− V ′′
(
Nx1ξ¯l
)
Nξ¯l
)
> 0
Furthermore, from inspection it is clear that if ξ¯l changes little with ξj, say because every
individual is negligible, then
∂2Uj
∂ξ¯l∂ξj
> 0 (4)
From equation (4) it is immediate that
Proposition 2 There exists an assignment equilibrium with top-down sorting under decen-
tralized effort choice.
2.3 The public good game: centralized choosing
Suppose instead that the level of contributions in a coalition are decided centrally by a
utilitarian social planner.
Uj = ξjV
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
−
1
2
x2j
U =
N∑
j=1
Uj =
N∑
j=1
(
ξjV
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
−
1
2
x2j
)
= Nξ¯lV
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
−
1
2
N∑
j=1
x2j
The FOC of the second stage problem are now
∂U
∂xj
= Nξ¯lV
′
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
− xj = 0
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so for all i, j within a coalition
xi = xj
Nξ¯lV
′ (Nx1)− x1 = 0 (5)
Totally differentiating 5 with respect to ξ¯l we get;
N
∂x1
∂ξ¯l
V ′′ (Nx1)Nξ¯l +NV
′ (Nx1) =
∂x1
∂ξ¯l
∂x1
∂ξ¯l
=
V ′
(
Nx1ξ¯l
)
N
1− V ′′ (Nx1)N2ξ¯l
> 0
so contributions increase with average quality. Hence equilibrium utility
Uj = ξjV (Nx1)−
x2j
2
remember that Nξ¯lV
′ (Nx1)− x1 = 0, so that
∂Uj
∂ξ¯l
= ξjV
′ (Nx1)N
∂x1
∂ξ¯l
− x1
∂x1
∂ξ¯l
= ξj
x1
ξ¯l
∂x1
∂ξ¯l
− x1
∂x1
∂ξ¯l
=
(
ξj − ξ¯l
ξ¯l
)
x1
∂x1
∂ξ¯l
=
(
ξj − ξ¯l
ξ¯l
)
x1
V ′
(
Nx1ξ¯l
)
N
1− V ′′ (Nx1)N2ξ¯l
where the sign is positive for j with ξj − ξ¯l > 0 and negative otherwise.
Remark 1 It is clear that with respect to the decentralized equilibrium some types of players,
i.e. those with a higher than average type within a coalition, have a higher utility while others,
i.e. those with lower than average type, have a lower utility.
Furthermore, from inspection it is clear that if changing a single ξj does not change much
the average type of a coalition, then
∂2Uj
∂ξ¯l∂ξj
> 0 (6)
From equation (6) it is immediate that
Proposition 3 There exists an assignment equilibrium with top-down sorting under cen-
tralized effort choice.
10
3 Endogenous size and social optima
In the previous sections, the size of coalitions has been exogenously fixed at N . But given
the environment considered, it would natural to consider the equilibrium when the coalition
size is also endogenous. This could have important implications both for the equilibrium
contributions, and for the efficient composition and size of the groups. One main tradeoff
is the following. In a larger group, the free-riding can become more problematic. On the
other hand, in a larger group, the marginal benefits of an action positively affect a larger set
of people. What is optimal will likely depend on specific features of the technology.
In this section we show that when the group size can be centrally chosen a utilitarian
social planner would sometimes prefer top-down sorting (we call this ‘segregation’) while
under other conditions she would prefer types to mix so that all groups have the same
average type (we call this ‘integration’).
We now use a CRRA V (.) function to analyze this problem.
V
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
=
(∑N
i=1 xi
)1−a
− 1
1− a
In order for this V (·) function to make sense as a production function, we assume xi ≥ 1.
Note that there is no risk in this problem, so we use the CRRA function as a convenient way
to parameterize concavity.
Then, for a given N the FOC for coalition efforts in this case are
Nξ¯l
(
(Nx1)
−a
)
− x1 = 0
ξ¯lN
1−a = x1+a1
Remember that in coalition all members choose the same value under centralized decision-
making and so xi = xj = x1 within the coalition. Thus the total utility within the coalition
is
Ul = Nξ¯l
(
N
(
ξ¯lN
1−a
) 1
1+a
)1−a
− 1
1− a
−
1
2
N
((
ξ¯lN
1−a
) 1
1+a
)2
so that
Ul =
(
1
1− a
−
1
2
)
ξ¯
2
1+a
l N
3−a
1+a −
Nξ¯l
1− a
and society welfare is
U =
L∑
l=1
Ul =
L∑
l=1
((
1
1− a
−
1
2
)
ξ¯
2
1+a
l N
3−a
1+a −
Nξ¯l
1− a
)
(7)
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Define UTD as the total utility obtained in society when coalitions are formed with top-
down sorting and V
(∑N
i=1 xi
)
=
((∑N
i=1 xi
)1−a
− 1
)
/ (1− α) .
Suppose that it is possible to organize coalitions so that all coalitions have the same mean
ξ¯l and define UI as the total utility obtained in society when all coalitions have the same
mean ξ¯∗l =
∑L
l=1 ξ¯l/L where ξ¯l is the group l mean under top-down sorting. Because all the
groups have the same average type, the optimally chosen contributions are the same in all
of them and thus no one has an incentive to choose the group to which they belong.
Remember that the central planner does not know the types of any of the players. Thus,
we assume groups are sufficiently large that simply allocating individuals randomly to groups
generates groups with equal average types in expectation.
Proposition 4 Suppose coalitions size is exogenously set to N . Then UTD > UI if and only
if a < 1.
Proof. This follows from (7) since
UTD =
L∑
l=1
((
1
1− a
−
1
2
)
ξ¯
∗
2
1+a
l N
3−a
1+a −
Nξ¯∗l
1− a
)
=
(
1
1− a
−
1
2
)
N
3−a
1+aLξ¯
∗
2
1+a
l −
LNξ¯∗l
1− a
=
(
1
1− a
−
1
2
)
N
3−a
1+aL
(∑L
l=1 ξ¯l
L
) 2
1+a
−
N
∑L
l=1 ξ¯l
1− a
UI =
L∑
l=1
((
1
1− a
−
1
2
)
ξ¯
2
1+a
l N
3−a
1+a −
Nξ¯l
1− a
)
=
(
1
1− a
−
1
2
)
N
3−a
1+a
L∑
l=1
ξ¯
2
1+a
l −
N
∑L
l=1 ξ¯l
1− a
so that by applying Jensen’s inequality, we have that
UTD > UI
Ul
N
=
1 + a
2 (1− a)
ξ¯
2
1+a
l N
2−2a
1+a −
ξ¯l
1− a
(8)
∂
(
Ul
N
)
∂N
= ξ¯
2
1+a
l N
2−2a
1+a > 0
This implies that for a given ξ¯l the average payoff in a group increases in N independently
of the concavity of the individual functional form within the CRRA class.
Given that proposition 4 establishes that average payoff in the coalition is concave in
average type for a > 1 and thus you want to form heterogeneous coalitions, it follows
immediately that
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Proposition 5 For a > 1 the social planner would like a single group of the maximal size.
When, on the other hand a < 1, there is a tradeoff for the “high” quality groups. On
the one hand, they would prefer to have total segregation to increase payoff, since average
payoff increases with average type as in equation 8 we see that it increases in ξ¯
2
1+a
l . On the
other hand, a bigger size increases payoff within the group, as in equation 8 we see that it
increases in N
2−2a
1+a . Clearly this tradeoff pushes for at least some degree of mixing.
4 Inter-coalition competition
So far, we have studied the problem of coalition formation and activities as if the activities
of those coalitions did not interact with one another. But in our motivation we discussed
the evidence that group formation often occurs in contexts where the groups compete, such
as gangs (Vigil 1996) or warfare (Sosis, Kress and Boster 2007). For this reason we will
now study the case where, after the groups form, they compete. The main insight of this
section, is that our earlier results also apply in this case. In particular, let us assume that
the coalitions compete, after having formed, in a contest. We will show that the incentives
for coalition formation that allow for a top-down sorting assignment (as in Proposition 2)
still hold in this case. To be more precise, take two coalitions with respective sizes M and
N but otherwise identical utility functions.
Then assume that the payoffs are given by2
Uj =
ξj
N
V
(∑N
i=1 xi
)
V
(∑N
i=1 xi
)
+ V
(∑M
i=1 yi
) − 1
2
x2j
and
V
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
=
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)b
;V
(
M∑
i=1
yi
)
=
(
M∑
i=1
yi
)b
and b < 1 which as shown in Proposition 4 is the case favorable to segregation into more
than one coalition.
Proposition 6 There exists an assignment equilibrium with top-down sorting under decen-
tralized effort choice when coalitions compete.
Proof. See Appendix.
2We assume that payoffs are the outcomes of a contest, and given by a contest success function, as in
Skaperdas (1996).
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5 Conclusion
We have studied a model of public good provision within groups. The group members have
heterogeneous preferences for the public good, and high types contribute more towards its
provision. Thus, all individuals prefer to be in groups with higher average types. We allow
for the existence of ‘entrepreneurs’ who create the groups and demand a (possibly non-
monetary) ‘fee’ to enter the group. We study the case where the ‘entrepreneurs’ can enforce
a contribution level within the group and also when once in the group, contributions are
voluntary.
We first show that both under centralized and decentralized provision there is top-down
sorting equilibrium in which groups are organized assortatively by type. Under centralized
contributions every participant is better off if average types increase. When contributions
are centralized that is not true and only above average types are better off.
There are interesting results in terms of welfare. Under more concave utility functions,
utilitarian welfare is higher when average types are the same across groups ( ‘integration’)
than under top-down sorting ( ‘segregation’). With less concave utilities, the opposite is
true. Concavity also favors large groups. Under less concave functions there is a trade-off, as
very homogeneous groups are good, but large groups are also good, so one could be willing
to sacrifice in terms of homogeneity to increase contributions because of group size. The
results are robust to environments in which groups compete among themselves.
While our results provide important insights, there are of course limitations to our anal-
ysis. For example, we have not studied repeated interactions, which, through reciprocity,
could lead to different results. We conjecture that in a repeated environment we would be
more likely to observe the results we posit under ‘centralized’ group management. We think
the reasons for assortative matching will survive in that case.
We have studied an environment where all the agents are ‘symmetric’ even if they have
different types. However, there are important applications where matching is bilateral, like
the marriage market. We think that some of our insights will carry over in those applications.
Indeed Greenwood et al. (2014) document an increase in marriage market assortativity
as an important source of inequality. However, it is not immediately obvious that our
welfare results on sorting will carry over in that context. Another intriguing question in
that environment has to do with the fact that in many species, it is only one of the sides
of the marriage market that engages in costly signaling before mating (Jiang, Bolnick and
Kirkpatrick 2014).
Our paper also provides interesting insights for public policy. Most extant foundations for
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‘integration’ policies, either in housing or school settings have to do either with concerns to
reduce inequality (Ananat 2011, Reardon 2016) or with direct spillovers from higher ability
individual on other individuals (Duflo, Dupas, Kremer 2011, Graham, Imbens, Ridder 2014).
We provide a new foundation for integration that is based on indirect spillovers. Individuals
do not care directly about the type of others’, they care because high types provide higher
effort towards public good provision.
It is worth commenting that the integration result in our model comes from the objec-
tive of social surplus maximization rather than equity considerations. Nonetheless, it has
equity implications as low types benefit from the higher provision of public goods in their
group. Thus, the efficient distribution is also equitable and may provide a new rationale for
integration efforts in different societies. Our model may also provide a different rationale
to whether the attainment gap of children (of lower socio-economic status) in segregated
neighborhoods (see for instance Ananat, 2011) may have something to do with the lower
provision of public good in such neighborhoods. If so, this may have positive implications,
particularly across generations, which may further strengthen case for integration. We leave
this interesting issue for future work.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
A member of coalition l with type ξi does not want to move to coalition l + 1 provided
that:
Ui
(
ξ¯l
)
− pl ≥ Ui
(
ξ¯l+1
)
− pl+1
Ui
(
ξ¯l
)
− Ui
(
ξ¯l+1
)
≥ pl − pl+1.
Such person will have a type such that ξi∗(l−1) ≥ ξi ≥ ξi∗(l). Then we have that:
Ui
(
ξ¯l
)
− Ui
(
ξ¯l+1
)
=
ξ¯l∫
ξ¯l+1
∂Ui
∂ξ¯j
dξ¯j
≥
ξ¯l∫
ξ¯l+1
∂Ui∗(l)
∂ξ¯j
dξ¯j
= pl − pl+1,
where the inequality is true by (1). Similarly a member of coalition l with type ξi does not
want to move to coalition l − 1 provided that:
Ui
(
ξ¯l
)
− pl ≥ Ui
(
ξ¯l−1
)
− pl−1
pl−1 − pl ≥ Ui
(
ξ¯l−1
)
− Ui
(
ξ¯l
)
Remember that ξi∗(l−1) ≥ ξi ≥ ξi∗(l). Thus:
pl−1 − pl =
ξ¯l−1∫
ξ¯l
∂Ui∗(l−1)
∂ξ¯j
dξ¯j
≥
ξ¯l−1∫
ξ¯l
∂Ui
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)
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(
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,
where, again, the inequality is true by (1). 
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Proof of Proposition 6
The FOC for the different players are now
ξj
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and substituting (10) into (9) we get
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and thus the condition 7 is satisfied so that we can have an analog of Proposition 2. 
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